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By WILLBURT D. HAM*
INTRODUCTION
Due to continuing developments in federal corporation law
as a result of activity by the Supreme Court of the United
States, Part I of this article will follow the pattern of previous
Surveys' by first reviewing two significant Supreme Court deci-
sions. This will be followed by reference to a recent decision
from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Part II will be devoted
to a review of three selected cases concerned with state corpora-
tion law, including a case from the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals applying Kentucky law pertaining to disregard of the
corporate entity.
I. FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW
A. Corporate Mismanagement
Perhaps no topic has been more in the forefront of corpora-
tion law in recent years than that pertaining to the relative
roles of federal and state law in dealing with the fiduciary
responsibilities of corporate management.2 Historically, the
regulation of corporate managerial responsibility was consid-,
ered to be a function of state regulation through the chartering
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1937, University of Illinois; J.D.
1940, University of Illinois; LL.M. 1941, Harvard University.
I For previous corporation law surveys, see Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-
Corporations, 65 Ky. L.J. 256 (1976); Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations,
64 Ky. L.J. 253 (1975); Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 63 Ky. L.J. 739
(1975).
2 This was the topic of a symposium sponsored and organized by the Federal
Regulation of Securities Committee of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Busi-
ness Law of the American Bar Association, held at the Airlie House, Warrenton, Va.,
on June 13-14, 1975. See Proceedings, The Airlie House Symposium, An In-Depth
Analysis of the Federal and State Roles in Regulating Corporate Management, 31 Bus.
LAW. 861-1213 (Special Issue, February 1976).
The term "corporate management" is used here to cover not only the fiduciary
obligations of directors and officers but also those of controlling shareholders.
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process.3 However, after the adoption by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1942 of rule 10b-5,4 which
broadly condemns fraudulent and deceptive practices in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, 5 the federal
courts found in it a new source for policing the fiduciary respon-
sibilities of corporate management.' As a result, it was not long
before much of the real action in this area of corporation law
became federal.7
No doubt the high-water mark in the scope and applica-
tion of rule 10b-5 on the part of the Supreme Court of the
United States was reached in Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,' decided by the Court in 1971. In
that case, the complaint charged a conspiracy between two
individuals to purchase from Bankers Life & Casualty Co. all
the stock of Manhattan Casualty Co. for their own benefit with
Manhattan's assets It was alleged that the two individuals
had secured a personal bank loan to make the purchase of the
' See Folk, State Statutes: Their Role in Prescribing Norms of Responsible Man-
agement Conduct, 31 Bus. LAw. 1031 (Special Issue, Feb. 1976). As Professor Folk
remarks, "Indeed, the notion of a federal polity, as well as the whole history of corpora-
tion law in America, argues for 'primary jurisdiction' by the states, rather than federal
preemption or even supplementation by federal law." Id. at 1032.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
5 The full text of the rule reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of busipess which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
' See Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31
Bus. LAW. 883 (Special Issue, February 1976).
See Folk, supra note 3, at 1032.
404 U.S. 6 (1971). Actually, this was only the second case involving § 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, despite the extensive volume of
litigation involving § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 that had developed by this time in the lower
federal courts. The first case was SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), in which
the Court held, inter alia, that the exchange of stock in a merger constitutes a
"purchase" of stock for purposes of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
1 404 U.S. at 7.
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stock and, after securing control of Manhattan, had repaid the
loan with money obtained from the sale of a quantity of United
States Treasury bonds held by Manhattan as an investment.'"
The Court held that this alleged "bootstrapping" operation, if
proved, stated a cause of action under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,11 the source of rule 10b-5.12
Speaking of section 10(b), which authorizes the SEC to adopt
rules and regulations prohibiting the use of "manipulative or
deceptive" devices or contrivances in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of securities, 3 Mr. Justice Douglas remarked, on
behalf of the Court, that "[s]ection 10(b) must be read flexi-
bly, not technically and restrictively." 4 He went on to hold
that there was a sufficient connection between fraudulent con-
duct and a sale of securities if the plaintiffs injury was "a
result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an
investor."'' 5 This liberal conception as to the type of fraudulent
conduct that could be brought within the ambit of section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 led to considerable speculation whether
the reach of rule 10b-5 could be extended to regulate the fair-
ness of corporate transactions as well as to assure their proper
disclosure.'8
Any such possible extension of rule 10b-5 now seems fore-
closed. In more recent decisions the Supreme Court has made
it clear that it expects a more narrow and restrictive reading
of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Its opinion in Santa Fe Indus-
' Id. at 7-8.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
2 404 U.S. at 13-14. As to the origin of rule 10b-5, see generally 1 A. BROMBERG,
SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE 10b-5 § 2.2(410) (1971).
" The full text of the section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1970).
2 404 U.S. at 12.
,S Id. at 12-13.
' See Kaplan, supra note 6, at 926.
1978]
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tries, Inc. v. Green," decided on March 23, 1977, underscores
this attitude quite forcefully. There, the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice White, stressed that for a claim to state a
cause of action under rule 10b-5 there must be allegations of
"manipulative or deceptive" conduct.18 In adopting this atti-
tude the Court rejected the position of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit that "'breaches of fiduciary duty by a ma-
jority against minority shareholders without any charge of mis-
representation or lack of disclosure"' could be treated as a vio-
lation of rule 10b-5.' 9 The court of appeals had held that use of
the Delaware short-form merger statute to effectuate a merger
in a "going private" transaction without any business purpose
gave rise to a dlaim under rule 10b-5,20 even where the merger
terms had been fully revealed to the shareholders.2 '
" 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
' Id. at 473-74. The Court remarked that "[t]he language of § 10(b) gives no
indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation
or deception." Id. at 473.
," Id. at 470.
0 The "going private" transaction in Green had been effectuated in the following
manner. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., through its wholly owned subsidiary, Santa Fe
Natural Resources, had acquired 95% of the stock of Kirby Lumber Corp., a Delaware
corporation. In 1974, a new corporation, Forest Products, Inc. was organized as a
Delaware corporation and Santa Fe Natural Resources transferred its Kirby stock to
Forest Products in exchange for all of Forest Product's capital stock. A merger of Forest
Products into Kirby was then arranged pursuant to § 253 of the Delaware Corporation
Law (the Delaware short-form merger statute), which permits a merger between a
parent corporation and its subsidiary upon approval of the merger by the board of
directors and shareholders of the parent corporation alone without the necessity of
approval by the outside shareholders of the subsidiary, where the parent corporation
owns at least 90% of the capital stock of the subsidiary. The merger plan called for
the minority outside shareholders in Kirby to be paid $150 per share for their Kirby
stock. A detailed financial information statement regarding the merger was sent, as
required by the Delaware Corporation Law, to the minority shareholders in Kirby after
consummation of the merger, along with notice of their right to seek an appraisal of
their Kirby stock in the courts of Delaware if they were dissatisfied with the offer of
$150 per share. Green, representing himself and other minority shareholders in Kirby,
brought a suit under rule 10b-5 in the federal District Court for the Southern District
of New York to have the merger set aside or to be awarded the fair value of the Kirby
shares, claiming that the offer of $150 per share was far below the true worth of the
stock and that the real purpose of the merger was to freeze out the minority sharehold-
ers. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Green v. Santa Fe Indus. Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
21 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976). The seeds for
treating rule 10b-5 as more than a "disclosure" rule were sown in Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), when the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an en. banc opinion, held that action by
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In reversing this decision by the court of appeals, the Su-
preme Court first stressed the need to consider the relevant
language of section 10(b), which refers to "manipulative or
deceptive" conduct."2 The Court concluded, as it had earlier in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,21 where it imposed a scienter re-
quirement for damage suits under rule 10b-5,14 that the word
"fraud" as used in rule 10b-5 to describe prohibited conduct
must be read in the context of those two words.25 Under this
guideline, the Court was unable to find any deceptive conduct
in the circumstances of the Green case, since there were no
misrepresentations or nondisclosures involved.2 Likewise, the
the controlling shareholder of an oil company in securing the issue of a quantity of
treasury stock of the company to the controlling shareholder at prices alleged to be
below the true worth of the stock based on knowledge by the controlling shareholder
of an oil discovery could be considered as constituting a fraudulent "act, practice or
course of business" under rule 10b-5. 405 F.2d at 219-20. However, the court's position
in this respect was weakened by its further recognition that there existed an element
of deception in the case resulting from the fact that while the board of directors of the
corporation was fully aware of the undisclosed information, the minority shareholders
were not. Id. at 220. In 1972, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
read Schoenbaum as a "deception" case and held that when there had been adequate
disclosure of the merger terms in a merger transaction, there was no basis for a rule
10b-5 suit claiming that the merger terms were unfair. Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714
(2d Cir. 1972). However, when Green was before the Second Circuit, Judge Medina,
speaking as one of a three-judge panel, observed that "[i]f there is no valid corporate
purpose for the merger, then evin the most brazen disclosure of that fact to the
minority shareholders in no way mitigates the fraudulent conduct." 533 F.2d at 1292.
Judge Medina accordingly held that the complaint in Green stated a cause of action.
Id. at 1291. Judge Mansfield concurred in the result, id. at 1294, and Judge Moore
dissented, id. at 1299.
Just prior to the decision by the Second Circuit in Green, another panel of judges
in the Second Circuit upheld a complaint by minority shareholders in a "going pri-
vate" merger transaction similar to that in Green, stating that a showing of misrepre-
sentation or lack of disclosure was not necessary for a 10b-5 claim. Marshel v. AFW
Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the Marshel case but vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals for a determination whether the case had become moot. AFW Fabric Corp.
v. Marshal, 429 U.S. 881 (1976). Plans for the merger involved in the case had been
voluntarily dropped after Supreme Court review was sought. See SEC. REG. & L. REP.,
(BNA) No. 373, Oct. 13, 1976, at A-14.
430 U.S. at 472..
- 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
2, In Hochfelder, the Court considered that the language "manipulative or decep-
tive" when used in conjunction with the words "device or contrivance" strongly sug-
gested "that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct."
Id. at 197.
430 U.S. at 471-74.
2, Id. at 474-77.
1978]
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Court found no evidence of manipulative conduct within the
meaning of that word as used in section 10(b), since the Court
assumed that the term "manipulative" was used in that sec-
tion as a word of art to refer to such practices as "wash sales,
matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead
investors by artificially affecting market activity."
Although the Court considered the language of the statute
to be dispositive of the case, the Court went on in Part IV of
its opinion to suggest additional considerations which it felt
weighed heavily against permitting a cause of action under rule
10b-5. 2, The Court first noted that it was dealing with an im-
plied cause of action for violations of section 10(b) rather than
with a remedy expressly provided by Congress,29 and that the
Court had adopted the position that "a private cause of action
under the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act
should not be implied where it is 'unnecessary to ensure the
fulfillment of Congress' purposes' in adopting the Act."3 Since
the Court considered the fundamental purpose of the Act to be
to implement a policy of full disclosure, the Court concluded
that "once full and fair disclosure has occurred, the fairness of
the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of
the statute."'"
A second factor which the Court thought warranted con-
sideration in determining whether Congress intended to create
a federal cause of action under section 10(b) for conduct related
to the "fairness" of a transaction was whether the complaint
was one traditionally concerned with state law. 2 Noting that
the Delaware legislature had provided minority shareholders
with the appraisal remedy when they objected to the treatment
accorded them in short-form mergers, 3 the Court considered it
" Id. at 476.
2 Id. at 477-80. Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Stevens, in separate con-
curring opinions, expressed their concern as to the implications of Part IV of the
Court's opinion, particularly since that portion of the Court's opinion was not neces-






3 Id. The appraisal remedy refers to the right conferred by modem corporation
statutes on dissenting shareholders, in connection with certain types of corporate
[Vol. 66
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appropriate to refer the complaining shareholders in Green to
their remedy under state law.34 The Court added that relegat-
ing the plaintiffs to state law was particularly important in
cases of this kind since otherwise it might prove impossible to
contain rule 10b-5, due to the difficulty of distinguishing
"going private" transactions from other types of securities
transactions involving fiduciary self-dealing.35 This, thought
the Court, could result in a widely expanded class of plaintiffs,
producing the danger of vexatious litigation that the Court had
spoken of earlier in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 36
in which it had approved the purchaser-seller standing require-
ment for plaintiffs in rule 10b-5 damage suits. 7 The Court said
that "[a]bsent a clear indication of congressional intent, we
are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of
corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particu-
larly where established state policies of corporate regulation
would be overriden. 35 In this respect, the Court added, it was
adhering to its position, previously asserted in the Bankers Life
case, that it did not consider Congress to have intended by
section 10(b) 'to regulate transactions which constitute no
more than internal corporate mismanagement.' "39
Perhaps none of the recent Supreme Court decisions under
the federal securities acts have as much potential for reesta-
blishing the supremacy of state law in the area of corporate
managerial responsibility as the decision in Green.4" Certainly,
changes, to be paid the fair value of their stock. See 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5906.1 (rev. penn. ed. 1970). The Delaware short-
form merger statute gives such an appraisal remedy to dissenting shareholders in the
subsidiary corporation. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253(d) (1974). For similar provisions in the
Kentucky Business Corporation Act, see KY. REv. STAT. §§ 271A.375, .400-.405 (Supp.
1976)[hereinafter cited as KRS].
m 430 U.S. at 478.
3 Id.
' 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
"7 430 U.S. at 478-79. The purchaser-seller standing requirement refers to the
requirement, sometimes called the Birnbaum rule, that a plaintiff in a rule 10b-5 suit
be a purchaser or seller of stock. The Birnbaum standing requirement had its origins
in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952).
" 430 U.S. at 479.
39 Id.
,0 The Court recognized that there might be a need for federal regulation of "going
private" mergers such as involved in Green, but cautioned that such regulation should
1978]
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the decision will help to reinforce a statement made by Judge
Stanley Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals a few years ago
that "the primary source of the law in this area ever remains
that of the State which created the corporation."4 On the other
hand, the impact of the Green decision on federal law should
not be overstated. In Green, Mr. Justice White explicitly recog-
nized the rather impressive line of lower federal court cases
upholding suits under rule 10b-5 based on the presence of de-
ceptive conduct resulting from misrepresentations or nondis-
closures.12 The continued vitality of these cases would still
leave federal law available in many situations where majority
interests can be found to have been less than completely candid
with minority shareholders when negotiating significant corpo-
rate transactions in which the majority have a personal self-
interest. 3
not come from judicial extension of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to "cover the corporate
universe." Id. at 480.
In a significant recent state law decision, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that
a corporate merger consummated for the sole purpose of cashing-out minority share-
holders constitutes a violation of the fiduciary obligations which majority shareholders
owe to minority shareholders despite the fact that the merger complied with all the
required procedural steps under Delaware law. Singer v. Magnavox Co., SEC. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA), No. 422, Oct. 5, 1977, at E-1 (Del. 1977). Subsequently, the same court
held that a corporate merger brought about by a majority shareholder primarily to
facilitate long-term debt financing on its part did not constitute a violation per se of
its fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders as expressed in Singer even though the
merger accomplished a cash-out of the minority. Tanzier v. Int'l Gen. Indus., Inc., 379
A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
4' Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 85 (1969).
4 430 U.S. at 475 n.15.
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) T 96,162 (2d Cir., Sept. 8, 1977), cert. denied, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No.
441, Feb. 21, 1978 at A-17. Commenting on the continued vitality of the Second Circuit
decision in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 906 (1969), after Green, Judge Friendly observed:
Schoenbaum, then, can rest solidly on the now widely recognized ground
that there is deception of the corporation (in effect, its minority sharehold-
ers) when the corporation is influenced by its controlling shareholder to
engage in a transaction adverse to the corporation's interests (in effect, the
minority shareholders' interests) and there is nondisclosure or misleading
disclosures as to the material facts of the transaction.
Goldberg v. Meridor, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,162,
at 92,265.
Judge Friendly also commented in Meridor that the requirement of full disclosure
should not be interpreted to mean that insiders must "characterize conflict of interest
transactions with pejorative nouns or adjectives." Id. at 92,266 n.8. Accordingly, the
federal District Court for the Southern District of New York has held that a share-
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B. Tender Offers
The interest in the law pertaining to tender offers has in-
creased dramatically in recent years, first as the result of the
enactment by Congress in 1968 of the Williams Act" regulating
tender offers at the federal level,45 and more recently as the
result of the proliferation of state "takeover" laws" enacted by
state legislatures to control tender offers at the state level.4
The first case to be considered by the Supreme Court of
the United States under the Williams Act was Piper v. Chris-
Craft Industries, Inc.,4" decided on February 23, 1977. This case
grew out of the tender offer contest waged between Chris-Craft
Industries and Bangor Punta Corporation for control of Piper
Aircraft Corporation, which Bangor Punta ultimately won
when it acquired over fifty percent of the Piper stock." While
the competing tender offers were pending, Chris-Craft brought
a suit against Bangor Punta in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York seeking damages and
injunctive relief.50 Although Chris-Craft was unsuccessful in its
efforts to obtain injunctive relief, it was successful after several
years of litigation in securing a damage judgment against not
only Bangor Punta but also Piper Aircraft and First Boston
Corporation, Piper's investment advisor and underwriter for
Bangor Punta securities.51 The judgment was based on viola-
holder's allegation of deception under Green must allege more than a mere failure to
disclose the "unfairness" of a transaction. Goldberger v. Baker, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,203 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 20, 1977).
1 Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending Securities
Exchange Act §§ 12-14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 1-n.
" See Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and Its 1970 Amendments, 26 Bus.
LAW. 1637 (1971).
' The Kentucky General Assembly adopted such a takeover law in 1976. See KRS
§§ 292.560 et seq. For a general discussion of this legislation, see Ham, Kentucky Law
Survey-Corporations, 65 Ky. L.J. 255, 278-83 (1976).
0 See generally Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects,
and Political Competence, 62 CoaR. L. REv. 213 (1977). It is significant that a federal
district judge in Texas has held that the Idaho takeover statute violates the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution and is preempted by the Williams Act. Great
W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
' 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
Id. at 9.
, Id.
51 The several stages of the litigation, from the filing by Chris-Craft of its initial
suit on May 22, 1969, to the final court of appeals decision on April 11, 1975, assessing
damages, is traced by the Supreme Court in the initial portion of its opinion. Id. at 9-
1978]
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tions of section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,52
which prohibits fraudulent conduct in connection with the
making of a tender offer."
A threshold question faced by the Court in the Piper litiga-
tion was whether a defeated tender offeror has standing to sue
under section 14(e).14 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit had decided that such a tender offeror does have the
requisite standing to complain,55 and that a claim for damages
on the part of Chris-Craft had been established." The Supreme
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Burger, reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals, holding that a tender offeror
does not have standing to sue for damages under section 14(e).11
The Court referred to its reasoning in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,55
in which it had implied a private cause of action in favor of a
shareholder under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act,5" dealing with the solicitation of proxies."0 In Borak the
Court had stressed the need for implying such a cause of action
21. The litigation was the subject of a feature article in Fortune Magazine. See Guz-
zardi, The Casualties Were Staggering in the Battle for Piper Aircraft, FoRTUNE, April
1976, at 90.
52 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
The section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipu-
lative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or
invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to
or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
Id.
5, The district court did not pass on the § 14(e) standing issue, since it found no
merit in Chris-Craft's claims. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337
F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)(opinion by Pollack, J.).
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 358 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 364-73.
430 U.S. at 42. In many ways this decision by the Supreme Court was a vindica-
tion for Judge Pollack, who, in his opinion as district judge, had shown a certain
disdain for allowing professional businessmen caught in the throes of a contest for
corporate control to avail themselves of laws enacted for the benefit of the unsophisti-
cated investor. 337 F. Supp. at 1131.
377 U.S. 426 (1964).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
5' Section 14(a) makes it unlawful for any person to solicit proxies in respect to a
registered security in contravention of such rules and regulations as the SEC may
prescribe "as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors." Id.
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in order to further the congressional purposes in enacting the
section, among which it found to be the protection of inves-
tors." Finding a similar purpose in the legislative history of the
Williams Act, the Court did not believe "that Congress con-
templated a private cause of action for damages by one of
several contending offerors against a successful bidder or by a
losing contender against the target corporation. 6 2 The Court
concluded that it was entirely appropriate to relegate the
tender offeror to available remedies under state law to the ex-
tent that the offeror seeks damages for having lost an opportun-
ity to compete for control of another corporation. 3 This latter
conclusion by the Court in Piper seems particularly significant
since it reflects an attitude similar to that which the Court
" 377 U.S. at 432. The Court said that while the language of § 14(a) made no
reference to a private right of action, "among its chief purposes is 'the protection of
investors,' which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to
achieve that result." Id.
62 430 U.S. at 35.
"9 Id. at 40-41. The Court considered this conclusion to be consistent with its
opinion in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). There, in determining whether a private
remedy could properly be implied in a statute which made no express provision for one,
the Court considered whether the cause of action was "one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappro-
priate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law." Id. at 78.
Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment reached by the Court in Piper
but only on the basis that he did not believe that the alleged violations of the securities
laws by the defendants caused injury to Chris-Craft, since it did not appear that Chris-
Craft would have necessarily been able to secure control of Piper even if the alleged
violations had not occurred. He agreed, however, with the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Stevens that Chris-Craft at least had "standing" to bring a suit under § 14(e).
430 U.S. at 48-53.
In his dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice Brennan concurred, Mr. Justice
Stevens reasoned that since in both proxy and tender offer contests the remedy which
will most effectively deter violations of the statute is the private damage action, the
remedy, when implied to ensure full compliance with the statute, must be available
to the litigants who are most vitally interested in effective enforcement. The potential
litigants who have the most to gain from enforcement of the statute, he observed, and
the most to lose if its provisions are ignored, are the rival contestants. So, he concluded,
"[o]nce one recognizes that Congress intended to rely heavily on private litigation as
a method of implementing the statute, it seems equally clear that Congress would not
exclude the persons most interested in effective enforcement from the class authorized
to enforce the new law." Id. at 62. He also expressed the view that he did not consider
Cort v. Ash, supra, to preclude standing to tender offerors under § 14(e). He pointed
out that "protection of tender offerors is not only consistent with protection of share-
holders" but "[i]t is also indispensible to protecting shareholders." 430 U.S. at 68.
In his opinion, he said, "the most realistic deterrent to fraud on shareholders is a
damages suit brought by the opposition in the tender contest." Id.
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expressed one month later in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green, 64 wherein the Court again referred to the need for federal
law to avoid entrenching on areas of concern traditionally con-
sidered to be the domain of state law." Furthermore, the re-
strictive position taken by the Court as to standing to sue under
section 14(e) is consistent with its similar restrictive holding as
to standing under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 in the Blue Chip
Stamps case.6"
Actually, however, the opinion of the Court in Piper is
severely limited in a number of respects. In the first place, the
Court made it clear that it was considering only the standing
of a tender offeror suing for damages in its capacity as a takeo-
ver bidder under section 14(e). 7 The Court added that it was
not considering whether shareholder-offerees, the class pro-
tected by section 14(e), had an implied cause of action under
that section, or whether the target corporation had standing to
sue. 6 The Court also indicated that it was intimating no view
as to whether a suit in equity for injunctive relief, as distin-
guished from an action for damages, would lie in favor of a
tender offeror under section 14(e).66 Finally, the Court said that
it was "unnecessary to consider the Court of Appeals' holdings
with respect to scienter, causation, the calculation of damages,
the imposition of joint and several liability, the liability of
underwriters in § 14(e) damage actions, and the award of pre-
judgment interest."70 Thus, the Court has so far avoided com-
ing to grips with the kinds of substantive issues relating to the
application of section 14(e) that it has dealt with under other
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, particularly section
10(b) and rule 10b-5.71 In view, however, of the popularity of
- 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
Id. at 478-79.
"Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
430 U.S. at 42 n.28.
6Id.
6 Id. at 47 n.33.
7 Id. at 47.
7, It is interesting to note in this regard that the court of appeals in Piper consid-
ered the controlling principles in determining § 14(e) violations to be the same as those
controlling violations of rule 10b-5. 480 F.2d at 362. The court said, "[Tihe underlying
proscription of § 14(e) is virtually identical to that of Rule 10b-5. . . .In determining
whether § 14(e) violations were committed in the instant case, we shall follow the
principles developed under Rule 10b-5 regarding the elements of such violations." Id.
[Vol. 66
1978] KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
the tender offer approach to corporate takeovers, that day may
not be far off.72 In the meantime, it is evident from decisions
such as Piper that a majority of the present Court believe that
it is desirable to restrict closely the class of litigants entitled
to the benefits of the antifraud provisions of the federal securi-
ties acts. 73
C. Insider Trading
Despite the recent efforts of the Supreme Court to contain
rule 10b-5, there remains a wide variety of situations to which
the rule can be made applicable.74 One of these involves trading
by insiders in the stock of their corporation on the basis of
undisclosed material inside information.7 5 Where such trading
" Such review may be hastened by the increased interest which the Supreme
Court has shown in recent years in accepting securities cases for review. Commenting
on the defendant-oriented construction which the Court has been giving to the scope
and coverage of the federal securities laws in the last four years and the dramatic
change this has produced in the availability of these laws to the investing public, one
writer has noted that "the depth and sweep of this change have been particularly
extraordinary when one considers the short period of time involved." Lowenfels,
Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum
Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891 (1977).
1 One of the concerns that has led to this restrictive attitude has been the fear of
otherwise encouraging and fostering vexatious litigation, which may, according to Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Blue Chip Stamps, "frustrate or delay
normal business activity of the defendant which is totally unrelated to the lawsuit."
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975).
11 Judge Collins J. Seitz, now Chief Judge of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
and a former chancellor in the Delaware state courts, made the following perceptive
observation at the Airlie House Symposium:
I think it is important to keep in mind that for over 99 percent of all
the cases in the Courts of Appeals of this country, one percent are ever
reviewed on the merits by the Supreme Court, and indeed, even less than
that. There are built-in limitations on the ability of the United States Su-
preme Court to review the ingenuity of some 80 or 90 circuit court judges
when addressing situations which they feel may cry out for redress.
Proceedings, The Airlie House Symposium, supra note 2, at 1024-25.
"' The case which firmly established rule 10b-5 as an insider trading rule was the
well-known Texas Gulf Sulphur case. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The SEC brought an enforcement
action against Texas Gulf Sulphur and 13 individual defendants claiming that the
individual defendants had violated rule 10b-5 by buying Texas Gulf stock at a time
when they possessed information regarding a major ore discovery by the company
which had not yet been publicly announced. It was in this case that the court set forth
the "disclose or abstain" rule for insiders. Judge Waterman, speaking for a majority
of the court, commented that "anyone in possession of material inside information
must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in
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takes place in the context of a closely-held corporation on a
face-to-face basis, there has been little doubt as to the right of
those deceived to sue for damages under the rule. 8 However,
when such trading activity occurs on the anonymous public
market, it has not been clear whether those trading on the other
side of the market from the insiders should be allowed to bring
private civil damage suits.77
The recent Sixth Circuit case of Fridrich v. Bradford" pro-
vides an excellent example of the judicial concern for damage
actions of this kind under rule 10b-5. 71 In Fridrich, one of the
defendants, J. C. Bradford, Jr., purchased 1,225 shares of com-
mon stock in Old Line Life Insurance Company on April 27,
1972, based on inside information concerning a proposed
merger of Old Line with another company." He sold these
shares on July 27, 1972, at a profit of $13,000.81 On November
10, 1972, the SEC filed a rule 10b-5 enforcement action against
order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from
trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside information
remains undisclosed." 401 F.2d at 848.
7" See, e.g., Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
7 See Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal
Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1361, 1379 (1965). Professor
Painter remarked:
The boundless scope of potential liability, by a class action or otherwise,
is enough to make the whole question of civil liability in this area controver-
sial. For failing to disclose relevant information during the course of a single
transaction in which he purchased a limited number of shares, an insider
could become virtually an insurer of the future losses suffered by all who sold
at about the same time. If several purchases were made, the extent of liabil-
ity on a per share basis would correspond with the volume of trading during
the period in question. If Section 16(b) has been criticized as being
"arbitrary" and "penal," an application of Section 10(b) in the manner
suggested above would be nothing short of confiscatory. Yet, any other ap-
proach would, of necessity, be arbitrary in its choice of persons accorded a
right to recovery.
Id.
The reference by Professor Painter to "Section 16(b)" is to § 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which provides for corporate recovery of any profits realized by
a director, officer, or 10% beneficial owner of a corporation's stock from trading activi-
ties in such stock within a six-month period. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
7s 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
, For a discussion of alternative remedies to the problem of insider trading in
publicly-held corporations, see Ratner, Federal and State Roles in the Regulation of
Insider Trading, 31 Bus. LAW. 947, 954-60 (Special Issue, February 1976).
542 F.2d at 310.
" Id. at 311.
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Bradford, Jr. and certain other named defendants, who were
also charged with insider trading violations involving Old Line
stock. 8 The other named defendants included J. C. Bradford,
Sr., who in 1961 had organized a syndicate to purchase a con-
trolling block of Old Line stock and who was the key figure in
the Old Line merger negotiations; J. C. Bradford & Co., a stock
brokerage firm which served as a market-maker for Old Line
stock and in which Bradford, Sr. and his son Bradford, Jr..were
managing partners; J. C. Bradford & Co., Inc., a corporation
wholly owned by the partners of J. C. Bradford & Co.; and Life
Stock Research Corp., a registered investment company,
eighty-one percent of whose voting capital stock was owned by
J. C. Bradford & Co., Inc. 83 As the result of a consent decree
entered in the SEC action, Bradford, Jr. was required to dis-
gorge his $13,000 profit and was permanently enjoined, along
with the other defendants, from any further violations of sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-
5.81 Later, a group of plaintiffs, who were owners of Old Line
stock and who had sold their Old Line stock in June, 1972,
brought a civil action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
against Bradford, Jr. and the other defendants named in the
SEC proceedings.85 The district court awarded a judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants, including Brad-
ford, Jr., in the amount of $361,186.75.11 This sum represented
the difference between the price each plaintiff received for his
shares sold during the period of nondisclosure and the highest
value reached by Old Line stock within a reasonable time after
the disclosure of the information wrongfully withheld."
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the district
court and remanded the case for entry of judgment for the
defendants.88 The court took the position that plaintiffs in rule
10b-5 damage actions must establish the causal connection
between the defendants' misconduct and their loss and that in
Fridrich the defendants' conduct, including that of Bradford,
A2 Id.
Id. at 309.
' Id. at 308, 311.
Id. at 312.





Jr., caused no injury to plaintiffs since defendants purchased
no stock from plaintiffs and their acts of trading had no effect
on the decision of the plaintiffs to sell.89 The concern which the
court of appeals had for the crushing liability which could re-
sult by extending the reach of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to
anonymous market transactions in private damage actions was
underscored by the court in the following remarks:
The key issue, as we see it, is not whether the proscrip-
tions of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 should encompass open mar-
ket transactions, which they should, but whether the civil
remedy must invariably be coextensive in its reach with the
reach of the SEC, which under the Act, was designated by the
Congress as the primary vehicle of its enforcement. We reject
such a view where its application leads us inexorably to an
unjust and unworkable result. By so extending the liability
of defendants here beyond that which had already been im-
posed through the SEC enforcement action, we believe we
would be doing violence to the intent of the statute and rule,
creating a windfall for those fortuitous enough to be aware of
their nebulous legal rights, and imposing what essentially
must be considered punitive damages almost unlimited in
their potential scope.
Where private civil actions under Rule 10b-5 have been
employed in essentially face-to-face situations, the potential
breadth of the action was usually contained. However, exten-
sion of the private remedy to impersonal market cases where
plaintiffs have neither dealt with defendants nor been influ-
enced in their trading decisions by any act of the defendants
would present a situation wholly lacking in the natural limi-
tations on damages present in cases dealing with face-to-face
transactions . . .90
The Fridrich decision stands in sharp contrast to an earlier
decision reached by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.' There,
the Merrill Lynch brokerage firm had disclosed to a group of
large institutional investors certain unfavorable financial infor-
mation it possessed regarding the earnings of Douglas Aircraft
Corporation before the information had been released to the
0 Id. at 318.
0 Id. at 320-21.
It 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
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public by Douglas Aircraft. 2 The institutional investors took
immediate advantage of this information and sold their Doug-
las Aircraft shares on the New York Stock Exchange.93 The
court of appeals held that the institutional investors were liable
to all public investors who were on the market buying Douglas
Aircraft stock during the same period that the institutional
investors were selling their Douglas Aircraft stock.94 The court
considered that the institutional investors had breached a duty
to the plaintiff investors by trading in Douglas Aircraft stock
without disclosing the material inside information they pos-
sessed and that under the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,95 all
that was necessary for the plaintiff investors to show in order
to establish the element of causation was that the information
withheld was material in the sense that a reasonable investor
might have considered it important in the making of his invest-
ment decision. In reaching this result the court was well aware
,1 Id. at 232. Merrill Lynch had received this information as a result of its position
as the managing underwriter for a proposed offering of debentures by Douglas Aircraft.
Id.
'3 Id. As a result of these actions by Merrill Lynch and the institutional investors,
the SEC instituted an administrative proceeding against Merrill Lynch and the insti-
tutional investors. Merrill Lynch submitted an offer of settlement which was accepted.
The Commission, however, pursued its case against the institutional investors and
ultimately approved a determination by a hearing examiner that the institutional
investors be censored for violation of the federal securities laws. In re Investors Man-
agement Co., Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July 29, 1971).
"1 495 F.2d at 237.
' 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
495 F.2d at 238. In Affiliated Ute the complaint charged that two bank employ-
ees induced certain members of the Ute Indian tribe to sell shares of stock held by them
to the employees and others, without disclosing to them that they had created a
secondary market in the stock on which the stock was sold at a higher price. In response
to the contention that the plaintiffs should be required to prove their reliance on the
information withheld, the Court remarked:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to
disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that
is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a
reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of
this decision. . . . This obligation to disclose and this withholding of a ma-
terial fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact.
406 U.S. at 153-54.
The court in Fridrich considered the language of Affiliated Ute to be inapposite
to anonymous market transactions. The court said:
It was shown in Affiliated Ute that the defendant bank employees had
engaged in prior business dealings with the plaintiff Indians. They entered
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of the damage problem resulting from imposing liability on the
institutional investors but left to the district court on remand
the assessment of appropriate damages. 7
The decision reached by the court in Fridrich eliminates
the damage issue left open in Shapiro but, as one commentator
has observed, "[s]ince proof of causation in nondisclosure
cases involving impersonal markets is almost impossible, this
position virtually eliminates recoveries by investors against
insiders in private 10b-5 actions.""8 The Fridrich decision also
into a deliberate scheme to induce the plaintiffs to sell their stock without
disclosure of material facts which would have influenced the decision to sell.
The resulting sales were a direct result of the scheme.
Here, unlike Affiliated Ute, defendants did not perpetrate any scheme
to induce defendants (sic) to sell their stock. Plaintiffs and defendants here
had no relationship whatever during the period in question. The plaintiffs
in Affiliated Ute had a right to expect that the defendant bank officials
would fully disclose all material information concerning the stock while in-
ducing them to sell. When defendants did not make full disclosure, they
breached Rule 10b-5 and became liable for plaintiffs' foreseeable damages.
The type of relationship existing between plaintiffs and defendants in
Affiliated Ute is totally absent here.
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d at 319-20.
'7 495 F.2d at 241. The court said:
In leaving to the district court the fashioning of appropriate relief, in-
cluding the proper measure of damages, we are not unmindful of the argu-
ments pressed upon us by all defendants that the resulting judgment for
damages may be very substantial in amount-in the words of defendants'
counsel, a "Draconian liability." This is an additional reason for leaving to
the district court the appropriate form of relief to be granted-a determina-
tion that can best be made after an evidentiary hearing and on the basis of
appropriate findings of fact.
Id. at 242.
"8 Comment, 30 VAND. L. Rv. 122, 128 (1977). In a concurring opinion which he
wrote in the Fridrich case, Judge Celebrezze took the position that under the "disclose
or abstain" rule of the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, "[tihe duty of disclosure is owed to
the class of investors trading contemporaneously with the insider and it is only this
group who are the proper beneficiaries of the relaxed causation standard of Affiliated
Ute." 542 F.2d at 326. Since the plaintiffs did not sell their Old Line stock until several
weeks after the defendants had ceased their purchases of such stock, Judge Celebrezze
agreed with the court's reversal of the lower court decision. Id. at 327.
It is interesting to note that when the Shapiro case went back to the district court
on remand from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the district court treated as
eligible plaintiffs not only those who purchased Douglas Aircraft stock at the same
time that the institutional investors were selling their Douglas stock but also those who
purchased up to the time the undisclosed earnings information was publicized. Shapiro
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95,377, at 98,877-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In his concurring opinion in
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ignores one of the assumed aims of rule 10b-5, namely, to pro-
tect investors from imbalances in trading opportunities on the
public markets resulting from the possession of nondisclosed
information by insiders.99 On the other hand, the potentially
unlimited liability faced by insiders under the Shapiro decision
makes that decision likewise unappealing absent some defina-
ble ceiling on allowable damages."' 0 One suggested solution is
to limit -the damages recoverable by plaintiffs in anonymous
market transactions to the amount which represents the profit
enjoyed by the defendant insiders from their trading activity. 01
While this solution also has its weaknesses, 02 it at least pre-
serves the private civil damage action as an effective tool for
policing insider trading in the open market, while at the same
time protecting insiders from possible catastrophic damage
awards. 103
Fridrich, Judge Celebrezze questioned whether this extended liability would be appro-
priate in a "straight insider trading" situation such as in Fridrich as distinguished from
a "tipping" case such as in Shapiro, when any informational imbalance in the market
resulting from a selective leakage of information might continue even after the
wrongdoing parties ceased their trading. 542 F.2d at 327.
" See, for example, the statement by Judge Waterman in Texas Gulf Sulphur that
"the Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace
that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to
material information." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
'* See Comment, supra note 98, at 129. In Fridrich, Judge Engel, who wrote the
majority opinion, pointed out that if all of the persons who sold their shares of Old
Line stock on June 13, 14, and 15, 1972, the days when the plaintiffs sold their Old
Line stock, had joined in the lawsuit, Bradford, Jr.'s potential damage liability would
have amounted to approximately $800,000. If the class of plaintiffs were increased to
include all investors who sold between April 21, 1972, when trading activity in Old Line
stock started, and June 29, 1972, the date of the first public announcement of the
proposed Old Line merger, Judge Engel calculated that the damages could have
reached approximately $3,700,000. Or if the class of plaintiffs were extended to Novem-
ber 20, 1972, the date the merger was approved by the SEC, damages could have
reached in excess of $7,000,000. 542 F.2d at 321 n.29.
,' See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1402(f)(2)(B)(Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973).
' One problem with limiting damages to the profits secured by the insiders from
their trading activities is that if there are a large number of individual plaintiffs and
the total recovery is prorated among them, the amount received by each individual
plaintiff may be so small as to provide little incentive for the bringing of such actions,
thereby eliminating the private damage action as an effective deterrent to insider
trading. However, as one commentator put it, "the actions would be brought-if only
for the attorney's fees just as they are now brought under section 16(b)." Note, Damage
to Uninformed Traders for Insider Trading on Impersonal Exchanges, 74 COLUM. L.
RaV. 299, 314 (1974).
10 See Comment, supra note 98, at 130. For another viewpoint as to how best to
control the damage award in private suits involving anonymous market transactions,
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II. STATE CORPORATION LAW
A. Corporate Entity
In the realm of state corporation law, perhaps the case of
most interest from the standpoint of Kentucky law during the
period covered by the present Survey is Poyner v. Lear Siegler,
Inc. 104 Poyner involved application by the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals of the Kentucky law pertaining to disregard of the
corporate entity in the setting of a products liability suit.0 5
The volume of litigation in personal liability cases involv-
ing attempts to "pierce the corporate veil" to reach corporate
owners has been considerable over the years."6 However, the
courts have differed considerably in the strictness or leniency
with which they have viewed the entity concept and as to the
particular factors that justify looking through the corporation
to its owners for settlement of third party claims.10 7 In Poyner
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the viewpoint that
the Kentucky courts have evinced "a general aversion for any
disregard of the corporate entity,"108 and approached Poyner
with this attitude in mind.09
The Poyner case arose as a result of injuries suffered by
Poyner, a sixteen-year-old boy, when a .22 caliber pistol with
which he and a friend were playing accidentally discharged."0
The gun had been manufactured by Erma Werke, a West Ger-
man company that was a wholly owned subsidiary of Lear Sie-
see Rapp, Fridrich v. Bradford and the Scope of Insider Trading Liability Under SEC
Rule lOb-5: A Commentary, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 67 (1977), in which the author recom-
mends adoption of the contemporaneous trading requirement used by Judge Cele-
brezze in his concurring opinion in Fridrich as a rational limitation on recovery in suits
of this kind.
104 542 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1976).
I" The entity concept is basic to the organization and structure of the American
business corporation. One of the principal advantages sought through incorporation is
the insulation which it provides from the debts of the business enterprise. This insula-
tion flows from the concept of the corporation as a separate entity whose rights and
obligations are separate and distinct from those of the individuals who compose it. See
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 118 (rev. ed. 1946).
,' See Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 Tax. L. REv. 979 (1971).
,01 See 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.3
(rev. perm. ed. 1974).
Io Campbell, Limited Liability for Corporate Shareholders: Myth or Matter-of-
Fact, 63 Ky. L.J. 23, 48 (1975).
lO, 542 F.2d at 958.
,,0 Id. at 957.
[Vol. 66
KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
gler, Inc., a Delaware corporation."' Poyner filed an action for
damages against Erna in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Kentucky under the Kentucky long-
arm statute,' claiming that his injuries had been caused by a
defect in the pistol, and he recovered a default judgment."13
Since Erma had no assets in the United States and since en-
forcing the judgment against Erma in West Germany would
have been expensive and time-consuming, Poyner filed a sup-
plemental complaint against Lear Siegler to hold Lear Siegler
liable for the judgment against Erma."' The court held that the
corporate veil could be pierced and that Lear Siegler was bound
by the original judgment."' The court noted that under West
German law, Lear Siegler, as sole shareholder of Erma, had the
right to interfere at any time in the affairs of the subsidiary;
that the two members of Erma's advisory board were Lear
Siegler personnel based in the United States; and that no for-
mal meetings of that board had been held nor records of meet-
ings kept."' From this the court concluded that Lear Siegler
had exercised its control of Erma to adopt a strategy designed
to frustrate recovery for injuries, regardless of the merits of
products liability claims, and had thereby worked "'an unfair
hardship on Erma's foreseeable American creditors.' """ This,
according to the court, called for ignoring the separate legal
identity of Erma."'
The court of appeals reversed the lower court and held that
the separate existence of the two corporations should not be
disregarded."' The court of appeals considered that under Ken-
tucky law a corporate entity can be disregarded only where the
artificial corporate personality serves to shield individuals from
legal responsibility for illegal or fraudulent acts,'20 and that
Ia.
2 KRS § 454.210 (Supp. 1976).
542 F.2d at 957.
I1 Id.
I d. at 958.
,,= Id. at 957.
,, Id. at 958.
l Id.
" Id. at 961.
2 Id. at 958. For a recent Kentucky case of this kind, see Dare To Be Great, Inc.
v. Commonwealth, 511 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1974), noted in Ham, Kentucky Law Survey,
Corporations, 63 Ky. L.J. 739 (1975).
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such a situation would result only where the existence of the
corporation deprived the plaintiff of a remedy which he might
otherwise have had. 121 The court pointed out that Lear Siegler's
acquisition of control of Erma had not resulted in any material
change in Erma's operations so as to deprive Poyner of any
recourse he would otherwise have had for his injuries. 2 The
court noted the position taken by courts in other jurisdictions,
particularly California, recognizing that the corporate veil may
be pierced if a corporation is undercapitalized.'23 However,
even assuming such a doctrine could be extended to a defen-
dant such as Lear Siegler which had not created an undercapi-
talized subsidiary but which had merely acquired a foreign
subsidiary with no United States assets, the court was unwill-
ing to accept this doctrine for Kentucky without a firmer recog-
nition of the doctrine in the Kentucky case law, which it was
unable to find. 24
The concluding paragraph of the court's opinion under-
scores rather well the fluid nature of the entity concept in cor-
poration law and the need perhaps for the Kentucky Supreme
Court in an appropriate case to reconsider some of the older
Kentucky precedents.'25 The court said:
This is the sort of appealing case which might have led
the Kentucky courts to reexamine the doctrine of limited
liability, or at least to further limit its application. However,
we must apply the law as it appears in existing Kentucky
decisions. We believe that it would be an unprecedented ex-
tension of the Kentucky doctrine to disregard Erma's sepa-
rate corporate existence in this case.'26
121 542 F.2d at 959.
,22 Id. at 960.
121 Id. at 958. For California cases stressing the importance of undercapitalization
as a factor in disregarding the corporate entity, see Minton v. Cavaney, 364 P.2d 473,
15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961)(tort liability); Automotriz del Golfo de Cal. v. Resnick, 306
P.2d 1 (Cal. 1957)(contract liability). Cf. Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276
N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966)(tort liability); Bartle v. Home Owners Cooperative, Inc., 127
N.E.2d 832, 140 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1955)(contract liability). See generally 1 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PIVATE CORPORATIONS § 44.1 (rev. perm. ed. 1974).
1 542 F.2d at 958.




B. Duty of Care
Litigation in other areas of state corporation law continues
at a steady pace in a myriad of contexts, which makes selection
of any particular area for comment somewhat difficult. How-
ever, one area, that relating to the care that should be required
of directors in the management of the corporate business en-
trusted to their charge, has been receiving increasing atten-
tion.12 There has long been a common-law doctrine that direc-
tors must not be guilty of negligence in the discharge of their
managerial duties,'2 but courts have not always made it clear
by what standard this duty of care is to be measured. 129
The generality of the concept is illustrated in Atlantic
Acoustical & Insulation Co. v. Moreira, 30 a recent case from the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Moreira, one of the two fifty
percent owners in a closely-held corporation and a director and
officer of the corporation, was charged with dereliction in fail-
ing to apprise the company's accounting firm of certain adverse
financial information which it was claimed would have affected
the accounting firm's evaluation of the stock of the corpora-
tion.'31 The valuation was being made to provide a basis for one
of the fifty percent owners to sell his stock back to the corpora-
tion and leave the business. 3 ' When the accounting firm an-
nounced its valuation of the stock, Moreira agreed with the
other fifty percent owner to sell his stock to the corporation at
the established price. 13 3 Moreira was paid partly in cash for his
stock and partly by means of a promissory note for the balance,
payable in two installments. 134 The corporation sued Moreira
127 See Proceedings, ABA National Institute, Current Problems of Corporate
Directors-Discharging Developing Responsibilities, 31 Bus. LAw. 1219-1442 (Special
Issue, March 1976). One of the speakers at this institute remarked, "A directorship is
not a mere honorarium. Being a director today is serious business. It carries with it
heavy responsibilities. No one should become or remain a director unless he is willing
and able to give the time and effort necessary to discharge those responsibilities."
Harris, Directors of Industrial Companies: Special Problems, 31 Bus. LAw. 1235, 1241
(Special Issue, March 1976).
'2 See 3 A.W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1029
at 11 (rev. perm. ed. 1975).
2, Id. at 12.
250 348 A.2d 263 (Me. 1975).
222 Id. at 264.





shortly after the first installment on the note became due and
succeeded in obtaining a temporary restraining order and later
a preliminary injunction preventing Moreira from suing on the
note.'35 In the subsequent trial on the merits, the trial judge
ordered the action dismissed,'36 and this was affirmed on ap-
peal. 3
7
The court concluded that on the basis of the evidence pre-
sented there was nothing to suggest that Moreira had failed to
discharge his obligation to exercise due care to protect the in-
terests of the corporation.'8 Although the case was treated as
one governed by general common-law principles, the court re-
ferred to the subsequent enactment by Maine of a statutory
provision, part of the newly adopted Maine Business Corpora-
tion Act,' 3 which stated that directors and officers of a corpora-
tion must discharge their duties "with that degree of diligence,
care, and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise
under similar circumstances in like positions."'4 This is a flexi-
ble standard, popular in other states as well,' which permits
a court to take into account the circumstances of each case,
including such things as the nature and size of the corporation
and the role of the particular director."' Another standard,
thought to be more strict, requires the director to discharge the
duties of his office with that degree of care which ordinarily
prudent men would exercise in their personal business af-
fairs.14 3
,35 Id. at 266.
138 Id.
"I Id. at 268.
'' Id. at 267.
ME. REv. STAT. tit. 13-A, §§ 101-1404 (1974).
140 Id. at § 716.
'" See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 717 (McKinney 1963).
14 A revision note to § 717 of the New York Business Corporation Act, which
adopts the "flexible duty" standard, says that "the adoption of the standard pre-
scribed by this section will allow the court to envision the director's duty of care as a
relative concept, depending on the kind of corporation involved, the particular circum-
stances and the corporate role of the director." Comment, N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 717
(McKinney 1963).
II See Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940). This was formerly
the statutory standard in Pennsylvania. See Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Amer-
ica, 224 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1966).
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Regardless of the particular standard used, directors have
rarely been held on a charge of negligence alone,' a result
which has caused some concern as to whether the law has been
too lenient in its attitude toward the responsibilities which
directors owe in the conduct of the corporate business.'45 On the
other hand, as has also been observed, "a heightening of the
level of care and diligence expected of boards of directors must
be accompanied by a rational and comprehensible redefinition
of the functions of boards of directors." ' An attempt at such
redefinition has been undertaken by the Committee on Corpo-
rate Laws of the American Bar Association in connection with
its recent revision of section 35 of the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act,"'4 which deals with the role and function of the board
of directors in the heirarchy of corporate management."' Of
particular interest in connection with this revision of section 35
was the addition to the section of an affirmative statement of
the standard of care expected of corporate directors."4 The
Committee explains that this addition was made to section 35
in recognition of the growing trend to introduce such provisions
in corporation statutes and in recognition of the desirability of
promoting uniformity in the development by statute of the
basis on which a director's performance should be judged. 5 "
" See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in Indemnification
of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1095 (1968). As Professor Bishop
said, "the search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations have been held
liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a
very small number of needles in a very large haystack." Id. at 1099.
-, See N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 78, at 274 (2d ed. 1971). Professor
Lattin comments, "Courts have been far too lenient in their treatment of directors who
do not direct under whatever rule they adopt as a test of liability." Id.
"I Vagts, Directors: Myth and Reality, 31 Bus. LAw. 1227, 1232-33 (Special Issue,
March 1976). See generally M. MACE, DmECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971).
W4 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr, Addendum B. (rev. ed. 1974)[hereinafter
cited as MODEL ACT]. The Kentucky counterpart to § 35 of the Model Act, absent the
recent revisions, is KRS § 271A.175 (Supp. 1976). Kentucky adopted the Model Act
in substantial part in 1972. See Ham, Kentucky Adopts a New Business Corporation
Act, 61 Ky. L.J. 73 (1972).
"I The standard operating procedure for corporations has been described as pyr-
amidal in form, with the shareholders at the base voting on matters of major corporate
concern, the board of directors at the next level setting the broad policies of the
corporation, and the officers at the top executing the policies set by the board. See W.
CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 150 (4th ed. unabridged 1969).
... MODEL ACT § 35 (as revised)(second paragraph).
"I Comment on Amendments to Sections 35 and 48 of the Model Business Corpo-
ration Act [hereinafter cited as Comment], MODEL ACT at 142. As a part of the
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The basic standard adopted by the Committee is the flexible
duty standard. 5 ' The new provision states that:
[a] director shall perform his duties as a director, including
his duties as a member of any committee of the board upon
which he may serve, in good faith, in a manner he reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and
with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like posi-
tion would use under similar circumstances.'5 2
The Committee points out that the language of this provi-
sion was framed in terms of "care" and not, as in some existing
statutes, such as Maine's, in terms of "diligence, care, and
skill"'53 for the reason that it was not clear just what "skill" and
"diligence" were expected to mean in relation to the perfor-
mance of directors as distinguished from "care."' 54 As they go
on to say, skill, in the sense of technical competence in a par-
ticular field, has never been regarded as a qualification for the
office of director, and, as to the concept of "diligence," that
seems adequately covered and included within the concept of
"care."' 55 The revised section also contains provisions recogniz-
ing that directors have a right to rely on information and opin-
ions supplied by others where such reliance is merited.'56 This
reliance can relate to information supplied by officers and em-
ployees, or by persons with special expertise or competence
such as attorneys or accountants, or by board committees. 7
overhaul of § 35, the Committee on Corporate Laws also approved changes in § 48,
which deals with the liability of directors in certain cases (declaration of dividends,
purchase by a corporation of its own stock, and distribution of assets in liquidation),
to make that section consistent with the changes made in § 35. See Comment, supra,
at 142. The Kentucky counterpart to § 48, without the changes, is KRS § 271A.240
(Supp. 1976).
'5, MODEL AcT § 35 (as revised).
"s Id. Unlike other statutes, the Model Act does not include officers within the
statutory standard. The Committee on Corporate Laws explains that since § 35 deals
with management by the board of directors, it was thought inappropriate to include
officers who were not also directors of the corporation. See Comment, supra note 150,
at 144. The Committee recognized that while a non-director officer may be subject to
a standard of care similar to that imposed on directors, the ability of the non-director
officer to rely on information supplied by others may be more limited due to his closer
association with corporate affairs. Id.
"= ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13-A, § 716 (1974).
"' Comment, supra note 150, at 143-44.
"' Id. at 144.
ts' MODEL Acr § 35 (as revised)(second paragraph).
257 Id. This portion of the revised section reads:
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The special attention given to the right on the part of directors
to rely on others results from a recognition of the inability of
directors, especially if they are "outside" directors, to assume
an active role in the daily operations of a large, complex busi-
ness enterprise. 5 ' In further recognition of the supervisory role
played by the modern board of directors, the Committee has
changed the language of section 35 from providing that the
business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by the
board of directors to providing that the business and affairs of
a corporation shall be managed under the direction of a board
of directors. '59 These recommended changes in the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act, if adopted in Kentucky and other Model
Act jurisdictions, should help provide the "redefinition of the
functions of boards of directors" necessary for the perfection of
a viable standard of managerial conduct.'1°
In performing his duties, a director shall be entitled to rely on informa-
tion, opinions, reports or statements, including financial statements and
other financial data, in each case prepared or presented by:
(a) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the
director reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters
presented,
(b) counsel, public accountants or other persons as to matters which
the director reasonably believes to be within such person's professional or
expert competence, or
(c) a committee of the board upon which he does not serve, duly desig-
nated in accordance with a provision of the articles of incorporation or the
by-laws, as to matters within its designated authority, which committee the
director reasonably believes to merit confidence, but he shall not be consid-
ered to be acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning the matter in
question that would cause such reliance to be unwarranted. A person who
so performs his duties shall have no liability by reason of being or having
been a director of the corporation.
'5' See Comment, supra note 150, at 142-43.
"' MODEL AcT § 35 (as revised) (first paragraph). The section now reads, "All
corporate powers shall be exercised by or under authority of, and the business and
affairs of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of, a board of directors
except as may be otherwise provided in this Act or the articles of incorporation. . ....
" As the Committee on Corporate Laws explained the changes in § 35:
Since the growth of the law in this dynamic corporate area will continue
to come through judicial interpretation, it is hoped that this clarification of
the statutory premise will assist the courts in recognizing more clearly the
practicalities of accountability in the corporate model and thus permit the
law to develop principles of responsibility and liability which more accur-
ately recognize the proper role of the corporate director.
Comment, supra note 150, at 147.
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C. Quorum
A recent Virginia case, Levisa Oil Corp. v. Quigley,'"' fo-
cuses attention on the question whether a quorum once estab-
lished at a shareholders' meeting can be broken by the subse-
quent withdrawal of a portion of the shareholders from the
meeting. 6' In Quigley, two shareholders owning a majority of
the stock in the corporation did this to prevent the election of
a board of directors which they feared would take action to
divest them of their control. 63 The majority shareholders had
made a motion to amend the bylaws of the corporation in cer-
tain respects, and when this was ruled out of order by the
chairman of the meeting, had made a motion to adjourn the
meeting, which was also ruled out of order.'64 After the with-
drawal of the two majority shareholders from the meeting, the
remaining minority shareholders proceeded to elect a board of
directors of five persons, as provided for in the bylaws of the
corporation, three of whom represented the minority inter-
ests. 65 These three then proceeded to meet and authorize a sale
to one of the minority shareholders of a quantity of treasury
stock of the corporation sufficient to divest the majority share-
holders of their control.'66 The dominant majority shareholder
brought a suit against the corporation and its minority share-
holders to invalidate the election of directors and the subse-
quent action by these directors in issuing the treasury stock. 67
The court granted the relief requested,' 8 and this was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Virginia.' 9
234 S.E.2d 257 (Va. 1977).
,' Corporation statutes customarily contain a section dealing with the quorum
requirements for shareholder meetings. See, e.g., KRS § 271A.160(Supp. 1976). Para-
graph (1) of this section provides:
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a majority of
the shares entitled to vote, represented in person or by proxy, shall constitute
a quorum at a meeting of shareholders, but in no event shall a quorum
consist of less than one-third (1/3) of the shares entitled to vote at the
meeting.
"1 234 S.E.2d at 258.
I Id.
,' Id. at 258-59.






The Virginia Supreme Court agreed with the lower court
that the quorum at the shareholders' .meeting was lost when the
two majority shareholders left the meeting and that any busi-
ness thereafter conducted was of no legal effect.' 7 The Supreme
Court found support for its position in the language of the
Virginia corporation statute, which established the quorum
requirement for shareholders' meetings as a majority of the
shares entitled to vote,'7' and in the bylaws of the corporation,
which spoke of a quorum for the transaction of business as
constituting a majority of the shares issued and outstanding. 72
The inference the court derived from this latter statement in
the bylaws was that no business was to be transacted at a
shareholders' meeting unless shareholders holding the specified
majority of shares were present. 73
Actually, the cases are divided somewhat on the question
whether, once a quorum has been obtained at a shareholders'
meeting, it can be broken by subsequent withdrawals of share-
holders from the meeting.' The Virginia Supreme Court in
Quigley noted, however, that in some of the cases adopting the
view that a quorum once established is not broken by subse-
quent withdrawals, the courts had emphasized that the share-
holders who withdrew had done so arbitrarily or capriciously. 75
In Quigley, by way of contrast, the court did not believe that
the two majority shareholders had withdrawn from the meeting
without justification, despite the fact that it was argued that
they could have achieved their ends by staying at the meeting
178 Id. at 259.
,.. VA. CODE § 13.1-31 (1973). The section provides as to quorum:
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a majority of
the shares entitled to vote, represented in person or by proxy, shall constitute
a quorum at a meeting of stockholders, but in no event shall a quorum
consist of less than one third of the shares entitled to vote at the meeting.
* Less than a quorum may adjourn.
172 234 S.E.2d at 259-60. The bylaws provided, as quoted by the court:
"A quorum for the transaction of business at any such meeting shall
consist of a number of members representing a majority of the shares of stock
issued and outstanding; but the stockholders present at any meeting, though
less than a quorum, may adjourn the meeting to a future time."
Id. at 260.
173 Id.
'71 See 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2013.1
(rev. perm. ed. 1976).
"' See, e.g., Hexter v. Columbia Baking Co., 145 A. 115 (Del. 1929); Common-
wealth v. Vandegrift, 81 A. 153 (Pa. 1911).
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and voting against the election of directors if they felt there was
a scheme on the part of the minority to divest them of their
control.' 76 The court reasoned that there was nothing improper
in the two shareholders, unversed in the intricacies of corporate
or parliamentary procedure, choosing a defensive action which
to them would best protect their majority interest in the corpo-
ration. 177
The effect of withdrawal of shareholders on the status of a
quorum once formed has been dealt with in some jurisdictions
by statute . 7 Kentucky is such a jurisdiction, having added a
paragraph to the Model Act section on quorum to take care of
such a situation.' 79 The added paragraph states that "[t]he
shareholders present at a duly organized meeting can continue
to do business until adjournment, notwithstanding the with-
drawal of enough shareholders to leave less than a quorum." 8'
This provision concerning withdrawal of shareholders was car-
ried into the Kentucky Business Corporation Act from the pre-
vious Kentucky General Corporation Law and so does not rep-
resent any change from prior Kentucky law.' 8' However, the
presence of such a statutory provision would appear to call for
a contrary result to that reached by the Virginia Supreme
Court under the circumstances of the Quigley case. In other
words, it would remove withdrawal from meetings as an effec-
tive defensive maneuver on the part of majority shareholders
,76 234 S.E.2d at 260-61.
,77 Id. at 261.
,' See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-65(c)(1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 608(c)
(McKinney 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1503(A) (2) (Purdon 1967). The new Califor-
nia General Corporation Law, which became effective Jan. 1, 1977, recognizes the
possible withdrawal of enough shareholders to break a quorum, but places some limita-
tion on the power of the remaining shareholders to act. See CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §
602(b) (West 1977). The provision reads:
The shareholders present at a duly called or held meeting at which a
quorum is present may continue to transact business until adjournment
notwithstanding the withdrawal of enough shareholders to leave less than a
quorum, if any action taken (other than adjournment) is approved by at least
a majority of the shares required to constitute a quorum.
,.. MODEL AcT § 32. The section provides, as to quorum:
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a majority of
the shares entitled to vote, represented in person or by proxy, shall constitute
a quorum at a meeting of shareholders, but in no event shall a quorum
consist of less than one-third of the shares entitled to vote at the meeting.
I- KRS § 271A.160(2)(Supp. 1976).
181 KRS § 271.335(2)(b) (repealed).
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in a corporation as a means of thwarting control efforts by other
shareholder factions in the corporation.
Despite the contrary position taken by the Virginia Su-
preme Court, there seems to be considerable merit in the Ken-
tucky statutory approach. There is no particular reason why
factions of shareholders in a corporation, whether majority or
minority, should be permitted to thwart the conduct of corpo-
rate affairs by the selfish expedient of breaking the quorum
needed to transact corporate business. Kentucky's approach is
said to represent the "modern and better view."' 8
M 5 W. FLETCHR, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2013.1 (rev.
perm. ed. 1976).

